| Author/Presenter |
Toko Kiyonari (McMaster University) |
| Co-author |
Pat Barclay (McMaster University) |
| Title |
Second-Order Punishment and Reward in Public Goods Games |
| Abstract |
One solution to the problem of free-riding in social dilemmas is the administration of selective incentives (i.e. sanctions), that take either a negative form (punishing free-riders) or a ositive form (rewarding cooperators). A "rational" perspective suggests that people are unlikely to pay to provide eiether rewards or punishment, so the type of incentive should not matter. However, we propose that the type of incentive does matter because the reciprocation induced by rewards (in real life) is more favourable to the rewarder than the retaliation often provoked by punishment, so people will have a preference for providing rewards, and will bring that preference into the laboratory environment. We predict that this preference for reward over punishment is particulary strong with "second-order incentives"--punishing non-punishers (who do not punish free-reiders) or rewarding those who reward cooperators. this prediction was supported by an experiment with 97 Canadian subjects who played a one-shot public goods game and were given two opportunities to either punish or reward other participants. Additional data from Japanese subjects who participated in the punishment condition alone indicated that second-order punishment (punishment of non-punishers) is extremely rate either among Canadian or Japanese participants. |
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