| Author/Presenter |
Nisha Malhotra (University of British Columbia) |
| Co-author |
Mukesh Eswaran (University of British Columbia) |
| Title |
Domestic Violence in Developing Countries: Theory, and Evidence from India |
| Abstract |
We provide a simple noncooperative model of spousal violence, in which violence is a means for enhancing bargaining power. It is used to ensure that the victim (a woman) allocates resources more in line with the preferences of the abuser (her husband). This is in accordance with the views of evolutionary psychologists, who argue that men use spousal violence to force women to behave in their (the men's) reproductive interests. We demonstrate that an improvement in the wife's threat utility may be accompanied by an increase, not decrease, of the spousal violence she experiences, while an increase in the husband's threat utility may lower it. Thus increases in women's education levels, outside options, and the support groups available to them may invite more spousal violence. After controlling for a whole host of factors, women's paid work is seen to increase spousal violence. We provide strong empirical support for these claims using the extensive National Family Health Survey data of India for the years 1997-98. We also find that women experience greater violence if the couple has an unmet desire for sons. There is less domestic violence if couples reside in joint families (husband's as well as wife's), relative to when they live as nuclear families. We examine how domestic violence impinges on the autonomy of married women. We attempt to address the endogeneity problem by suitable choice of instruments. Though there are some regional variations, the broad thrust of our results from the 14 major states of India is unambiguous: domestic violence undermines women's autonomy. |
| Web Link |
http://economics.ca/2008/papers/0711.pdf |
|